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ABSTRACT
Wage formation is often analyzed by assuming that wage differentials reflect
productivity differentials intrinsic to the workers, like differences in skill or
qualification. Observed industry and firm effects on wages suggests, however,
that wage differentials may result from causes rather unrelated to intrinsic
productivity. This paper considers the polar case of homogeneous labor.
The wage differentials emerging here are, thus, unrelated to individual dif-
ferences. The model used is of an economy with a segmented labor market
in which the primary sector industries are characterized by high turnover
costs. This induces firms to pay efficiency wages reflecting turnover costs. The
turnover case offers some rather surprising yet straightforward conclusions
regarding efficiency, discrimination and taxation: Workers capture job rents;
wage dispersion is too high; considerable wage differentials may arise from
infinitesimally small differences in productivity; and a progressive wage tax
will be welfare-enhancing.
JEL classification: J, J, J, J, H, H
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I –  O –  TM –  O –  S
C  D –  H 
D –  AW T –  D – C R
I
Many approaches to wage formation build on the assumption that wage differentials
reflect productivity differentials intrinsic to the workers, like differences in skill
or qualification. The discussion about industry effects and firm effects on wages
suggest however that wage differentials may result from causes rather unrelated to
intrinsic productivity. Thus, this paper considers the polar case of wage differentials
arising in a framework of a segmented labor market and homogeneous labor,
characterized by primary sector industries with high turnover costs. These turnover
costs induce them to pay efficiency wages.The distinction of segmented labor
markets along efficiency-wage lines is customary. I am going to stress, however,
the turnover aspect rather than the discipline function of wages. This case offers
some interesting conclusions regarding efficiency, discrimination and taxation and
may be of some empirical relevance.
It is argued, in particular
• that the existence of job rents induces distortions in prices and employment
levels and associated inefficiencies;
• that discrimination can be triggered either by productivity related factors or
by entirely arbitrary factors;
 See B and S (), D and K (), M and T (), L
and W (), K and S (), T (), O (), H and G
(), G (a,b), K and S (), B and N (),
S (), B and M (), M and B (), A and
K ().  For turnover efficiency wages, see P (), S (), S
(), and S (); for discipline wages see S (), S and S (), and
F (). Surveys of efficiency wage theory are provided by Y (), and S ().
 See Y (), A and Y (), B and S (), K and
S (), and A and V ()  See C ().

• that equilibrium data will exhibit a spurious correlation between arbitrary
traits of the workers and productivity even if no real productivity differentials
exist; and
• that a progressive wage tax will reduce job rents in equilibrium and will
increase economic efficiency.
The results are obtained in a very stylized setting, where the allocative function of
wages is restricted to their effect on product prices and consumer choice. In more
realistic settings with heterogeneous labor, the wage structure may contribute to
allocating labor concordant with comparative advantage. This aspect is faded out
here in order to emphasize the rent aspect of wage formation. A more realistic
treatment would require disentangling the favorable effects fostering comparative
advantage and the adverse rent effects, but such an inquiry would outrange the
compass of this paper.
 O
The paper considers a set of segregated industries in the primary sector of an econ-
omy that differ only with respect to labor turnover costs. Labor is homogeneous.
New entrants into the labor market enter one of the industries or the secondary
competitive sector. If a new entrant does not succeed in obtaining a job in a
high-paying primary industry, he settles for a lower-paying job in another primary
industry or, at worst, for a job in the competitive sector which operates under
standard competitive conditions. The firms in the primary sector industries pay
different efficiency wages in order to optimally cope with differences in turnover
costs. Although there is an excess supply of new applicants in those high-wage in-
dustries in equilibrium, the firms maintain their high wages in order to economize
on turnover costs. This is modelled in section .
Free entry to all industries causes prices to reflect wage differentials plus differ-
entials in turnover costs. As a result, turnover costs enter total production costs
twice, both indirectly as determinants of high wages, and directly as components
of production costs. In section  it is argued that efficiency considerations would
require labor inputs in all industries to be evaluated at the same shadow price,
which is taken as the wage rate prevailing in the competitive sector. However, firms
will use their actual wages, rather than the competitive wage rate, for evaluating
labor inputs. This renders the products of high-wage industries too expensive.

Free entry will, thus, bring about prices which reflect wage differentials. As
the value-added per worker is evaluated at equilibrium prices, value-added per
worker appears high in high-wage industries, and low in low-wage industries, in
spite of the assumption of homogeneous labor. As the primary jobs are rationed in
equilibrium, and labor is assumed to be homogeneous, applicants can be selected
by using some arbitrary criterion. There is scope for costless discrimination. This
is described in section . Further, if there is employment discrimination, in the
sense that applicants for high–wage jobs are screened by an irrelevant feature, this
feature will appear linked to the workers’ productivity, in spite of its irrelevance.
In section  it is argued that small differences in productivity or turnover be-
havior between different groups of workers may induce quite inequitable treatment
in equilibrium, with unpredictable efficiency implications.
In section  it is argued that a progressive wage tax may help to alleviate the
inefficiencies described in this paper because such a tax will render it more costly for
the firms to control turnover by means of high wages, and this reduces the incentive
to use high wages for these purposes. As a result, job rents will be abated and the
wage structure will be flattened across industries. This attenuates inefficiencies.
The model presented in this paper has deliberately been devised such as to ex-
hibit some mechanisms in a particularly simple and uncontaminated form. Section
 discusses issues that emerge if these stringent assumptions are relaxed. Some
general problems relating more broadly to efficiency wage models are pertinent
here. It is argued further that more realistic conditions will not eliminate the effects
studied in this paper, but will lead to somewhat blurred and ambiguous conclusions.
A brief summary follows.
 TM
Consider an economy with a set of industries, indexed by i = 1,2, ... , I. Labor
is homogenous. The number of firms in each industry is determined by a free
entry/zero profit condition. The economy comprises, further, a competitive sector
which offers the wage rate w for labor. Thus, w can be taken as an exogenous
shadow price for labor in the subsequent argument. In order to rule out all effects
stemming from different production technologies, all firms are assumed to produce
according to the same continuous production function f (), relating labor input n,
to output x. Production exhibits decreasing marginal productivity and satisfies the

Inada condition:
f > 0, f ′ > 0, and f ′′ < 0 for n> 0,
f (0) = 0, f ′ (0) = ∞, f ′ (∞) = 0. ()
The typical firm in industry i produces xi units of the industry output and employs
ni units of labor:
xi = f (ni) . ()
All firms face labor turnover. Consider a typical firm in industry i. Its turnover rate
is τi. This will depend inversely on the wage rate vi offered by the firm in relation
to the wage level wi prevailing in industry i
τi = τ (vi/wi) , τ ′ < 0. ()
The argument underlying this “black box” assumption is that there will be some
“natural” turnover if all firms pay the same wage. If one single firm offers better
terms, it can reduce turnover by delaying quits. Further, the workers in the different
industries are assumed to form essentially non–competing groups. A particularly
simple way to produce this feature is to assume that each firm prefers trained
workers drawn from other firms from its own industry to untrained workers, and
untrained workers to trained workers from other industries. As a result, each
worker who has accepted a certain job when entering the labor force has the choice
to remain in the chosen industry or join the lower–paying competitive sector,
but is excluded from competing for other primary jobs. This—admittedly very
restrictive—assumption renders the subsequent argument very transparent because
it permits the supposition that turnover rates in any particular industry will depend
only on the particular industry’s wages and will be independent of the wages paid
in other industries. (Section  below will discusses a possible relaxation of this
assumption.)
In order to concentrate on differences between industries, rather than on indi-
vidual differences, it is assumed for the time being that the function τ(·), describing
turnover behavior, is identical across all industries. Industries differ only with re-
spect to turnover costs. More specifically, turnover costs in industry i are a multiple
ci of the turnover rate. Total labor costs for a firm in industry i employing ni
 For more detailed argument, see S ().  The discussion in the preceding paragraph
suggests that training costs for newcomers will be higher than those poached from other firms of
the industry. Turnover costs ci should thus be interpreted as reflecting average turnover costs, given
the usual mix of trained and untrained new hires. An explicit modelling would distract from the
theme pursued here. See S () for a treatment of this issue.

workers are, thus, given by the sum of the wage bill vini and turnover costs τicini:
(vi+ τ (vi/wi)ci) ni. ()
In addition to labor costs, there are fixed costs of q occurring in each firm. Total
profits of a typical firm in industry i are therefore
pi f (ni)− (vi+ τ (vi/wi)ci) ·ni−q. ()
The typical firmmaximizes this by choosing appropriate labor input ni. Further,
the firm maximizes profits by selecting an optimal firm-specific wage rate vi, given
the industry wage wi, in order to control turnover. This leads to the necessary
conditions for an inner maximum:
pi f ′ = vi+ τci ()
− τ ′ (vi/wi)ci = wi, τ ′′ > 0. ()
If the wage rate resulting from () and () is below the competitive wage, the
firm is forced to pay the competitive wage rate w in order to attract workers and a
boundary solution obtains, with equation () replaced by the condition wi = w.
The optimal wage rate vi is thus as a function of the industry wage wi, turnover
costs ci, and the competitive wage w:
vi = ψ (wi,ci,w) :=max{w,φ (wi,ci)} ()
with
∂φ
∂wi
=
vi
wi
− wi
civiτ ′′
where φ (wi,ci) refers to the interior solution of (). Starting with an industry wage
rate wi, each firm in the industry will select the optimal wage rate vi = ψ (wi,ci).
For vi > wi, the industry wage level will increase; for vi < wi it will decrease.
This is formalized in the following adjustment process with λ > 0 as the speed of
adjustment:
w˙i = λ (ψ (wi,ci,w)−wi) . ()
 This assumption seems appropriate because the firms can be supposed to incur other costs
beyond wage costs. In a technical sense, the assumption is needed to generate a cost–minimizing
employment level which is positive, although the analysis could be carried through in a formal sense
without this assumption.  Firms are thus assumed to have stationary expectations regarding the
industry wage level. This prevents immediate adjustment. Staggered labor contracts may lead to a
similar aggregate result.

Equilibrium is given by:
wi =max
{
w,−τ ′ (1) ci
}
. ()
Those industries with rather low turnover costs will, thus, pay the competitive wage
whereas firms with turnover costs exceeding a critical level will pay wages above the
competitive wage. The set of industries may be classified accordingly. Renumber
the industries such that the first P industries have equilibrium wages above the
competitive level, and the remaining I−P industries have equilibrium wages that
equal the competitive wage.
wi =−τ ′ (1)ci > w for i= 1,2, ... ,P
wi = w for i= P+1,P+2, ... , I .
()
The former set of industries forms the “primary” sector in the economy. All other
firms may be lumped together with the competitive sector to form the “secondary”
sector of the economy.
The wage changes in the primary sector around equilibrium are obtained from
() and () as
∂ w˙i
∂wi
< 0 at wi = ψ (wi,ci) for i= 1,2, ... ,P . ()
Thus, wi increases if it is below equilibrium and decreases if above equilibrium, and
the equilibrium industry wage () is stable for primary sector industries. It is also
stable for the remaining industries because the competitive level sets the lower limit
for wages, and () holds true above the competitive level.
The subsequent argument will concentrate on the primary sector industries
(i= 1,2, . . . ,P) alone and take the competitive wage level as a given. Primary sector
industries pay, thus, the equilibrium wage rate
wi =−τ ′ (1)ci > w for all i= 1,2, ... ,P . ()
The difference between the industry wage wi and the competitive wage w is the job
rent ri:
ri := wi−w, i= 1,2, ... ,P . ()
Introduce the following notation for equilibrium turnover and equilibrium
turnover sensitivity:
τ := τ(1), σ :=−τ ′(1). ()

Assume free entry. This will drive prices to minimum unit costs:
p∗i =minni
(
(wi+ τci)ni+q
f (ni)
)
= min
ni
(
(w+ ri+ τci)ni+q
f (ni)
)
. ()
Since
∂ 2pi
∂n2i
=
−pi f ′′(ni)
f 2 (ni)
> 0 at
∂ pi
∂ni
= 0, ()
the minimum is unique. Denote the corresponding labor input by
n∗i = argminni
(
(wi+ τci)ni+q
f (ni)
)
= argmin
ni
(
(w+ ri+ τci)ni+q
f (ni)
)
. ()
The equilibrium price of industry i can be written as
p∗i =minni
(
(σciwi+ τci)ni+q
f (ni)
)
, i= 1,2, ... ,P . ()
Thus, the minimum is increasing in the sensitivity to turnover σ , in turnover τ , in
fixed costs q, and in turnover costs, ci for all primary sector industries
∂ p∗i
∂σ
> 0,
∂ p∗i
∂τ
> 0,
∂ p∗i
∂q
> 0,
∂ p∗i
∂ci
> 0. ()
 O
Consider now the social optimum. Take first employment per firm ni in all primary
sector industries as given and fixed. It will be determined optimally, later.
If one additional firm is employed in industry i, this leads to additional output
f (ni) and requires opportunity costs of labor niw, turnover costs τcini, and fixed
costs q. Thus, one additional unit of output gives rise to additional social costs
pi =
(w+ τci)ni+q
f (ni)
. ()
A social planner will minimize these social costs by selecting the firm size in each
industry optimally. Denote the corresponding optimal labor inputs by nˆi and the
corresponding socially optimal prices by pˆi.
pˆi = min
ni
(w+ τci)ni+q
f (ni)
()
nˆi = argmin
ni
(w+ τci)ni+q
f (ni)
. ()

Compare these conditions with the equilibrium conditions for employment and
prices, as given by () and (). The formulae differ only in that optimality requires
all wages to be equalized to the shadow price of labor, w , but equilibrium wages are
higher. More specifically, from the definitions () of pˆi and () of p∗i it follows
that
pˆi <
(w+ τci)n∗i +q
f
(
n∗i
) < (w+ ri+ τci)n∗i +q
f
(
n∗i
) = p∗i ()
and hence
p∗i − pˆi >
ri
f
(
n∗i
)
/n∗i
()
which implies that price distortion exceeds the job rent accruing per unit of output,
evaluated at optimal labor input. The job rents ri induce, thus, two kinds of
distortion: Higher wages are passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.
This distorts their choice of consumption. Further, high labor costs lead to sub-
optimal firm sizes in high-wage industries.
Popular notions of justice would, in this simple setting, suggest equal wages
across industries, because labor is homogeneous. Competition induces, however,
wage dispersion corresponding to the spread in turnover costs. There is a conflict
between market outcomes and fairness notions. Such a conflict is quite common
(K et al., ). Usually we expect fairness notions to hamper efficient
market outcomes. What is striking here is, however, that the market outcome is
inefficient and an implementation of popular fairness notions such as ‘comparable
worth’ legislation against the market would improve efficiency.
 S C  D
Value-added per worker in industry i is given by the difference between proceeds
and non-labor costs per worker:
µi :=
pi f (n)−q
ni
− τci i= 1,2, ... ,P . ()
In equilibrium, equation () implies that wages correspond to value-added:
wi = µi, i= 1,2, ... ,P . ()

While it appears as if value-added determines wages, causality actually runs in the
other direction. Since labor is homogenous and the primary-sector jobs must be
rationed, there is scope for costless discrimination.
This case is of particular interest because conventional theories of discrimi-
nation imply efficiency, rather than inefficiency, of discrimination. Assume, for
instance, that jobs are rationed according to “accent“, where accent ranges con-
tinuously between p and q (for “pidgin” and “queen’s”, respectively). The result
is a correlation between wage, value-added and accent, in which accent appears
as having productive value. An arbitrary feature like accent may thus trigger
significant discrimination, and empirical observations appear to reconfirm the
(wrong) prejudice that the triggering feature is related to the worker’s productive
contribution.
 H  D
Discrimination theory has traditionally been concerned with studying differential
treatment of economically identical individuals. It is, however, useful to conceive
discrimination in a slightly broader way as comprising cases where slight individ-
ual productivity-related differences induce significant and systematic differential
treatment. Discrimination which is triggered by some productivity-related trait
may take a rather stubborn form. Consider first two groups of workers which
differ solely with respect to their productivity. Index these groups by m and f ,
respectively, where m stands for “male” and f stands for “female”. Productivity of a
female is (1− ε) times the productivity of a male, with ε > 0 arbitrarily close to
zero. Denote the corresponding industry wages by wmi and w
f
i , respectively, and
denote the typical firm’s wage offers by vmi and v
f
i . Turnover of males and females
is identical and is given by τ (vmi /w
m
i ) and τ
(
v fi /w
f
i
)
. Turnover costs are identical
for males and females and are equal to ci. The firm will be interested in minimizing
unit costs of labor for males and females by selecting the gender-specific wage rates
optimally:
v fi + τ
(
v fi /w
f
i
)
ci → min
v fi
. ()
 This is similar to S’s() paper on efficiency wage discrimination.  E.g. taste discrim-
ination (B, ) or statistical discrimination (P, ).

This leads to conditions analogous to (), and to an adjustment process analogous
to (). In equilibrium we must have vmi = w
m
i and v
f
i = w
f
i ; thus:
wmi = w
f
i = σ · ci . ()
Consequently, efficiency wage reasons would lead to the identical equilibrium wages
for men and women in equilibrium, in spite of women being infinitesimally less
productive than men. The reason is that firms optimize with respect to turnover
costs, and these are identical for males and females, leading to identical wage
policies for males and females.
Women are, however, assumed to be slightly less productive than men. As
firms have a choice to hire either men or women, they will prefer men, and job
discrimination results. Women will not be hired and are forced to accept other
jobs which less compensation. In this way, very small productivity differentials can
trigger significant differential treatment.
Consider now the case that the groups differ not with respect to intrinsic
productivity, but with regard to turnover behavior. Slight differences in this respect
may again trigger job discrimination. This would again induce job discrimination,
in spite of equal productivity.
Denote the relevant gender-specific sensitivities of turnover to wage changes
by σm and σ f , and the corresponding turnover rates by τ f and τ f (see ()).
Equilibrium wages for men and women are now wmi = σ
m · ci and w fi = σ f · ci,
respectively. Costs entailed by employing one male worker amount to (τm+σm)ci.
Analogously, a female worker costs
(
τ f +σ f
)
ci. The associated turnover costs are
σmci and σ f ci.
Males are preferred over females whenever total labor costs are lower for males.
Total labor costs are the sum of wages and turnover costs. Consider two cases where
this occurs and males are preferred over females.
The first case is characterized by comparatively low turnover costs for males:
τm < τ f and σm > σ f with (τm+σm)<
(
τ f +σ f
)
. ()
In this case, men are cheaper to employ than women and thus preferred over
women, although their equilibrium wage is higher. Women will have higher
turnover. The associated higher costs outweigh their lower wages, and males
are preferred. It is socially optimal to discriminate against women because this
saves turnover costs for society.

Another case would be that turnover costs of males exceed those of females, but
their sensitivity to wage changes is less:
τm > τ f and σm < σ f with (τm+σm)<
(
τ f +σ f
)
. ()
Here, men are again cheaper and will be preferred, although their employment
entails higher turnover costs. The resulting employment discrimination of women
is socially inefficient. The turnover perspective thus leads to insights regarding
discrimination that complement related arguments developed from a shirking
perspective.
 AW T
Consider the welfare effects of a wage tax. There is a tax function z() which gives,
for any wage level, the corresponding wage tax. Assuming that after-tax wages
determine turnover behavior. With the previous notation, we may re-write () as:
τi = τ
vi− z(vi)
wi− z(wi) , i= 1,2, ... ,P. ()
If we calculate the equilibrium wage rate similarly to ()–(), we obtain instead of
() the equilibrium condition
wi =
1− z′ (w)
1− z(wi)/wi ·σci, i= 1,2, ... ,P. ()
Without a tax, the equilibrium wage in industry i has been determined as wi =
σci. A progressive wage tax, i.e. a tax with z′ (wi) > z(wi)/wi, will reduce wage
differentials. However, this has no impact on turnover costs, since it is only relative
wages within each industry that matter, and these remain unaffected. Wages are,
however, brought closer to their competitive level. This removes associated price
and employment distortions and results in efficiency gains from taxation.
 D
Bonding. The model is driven by the assumption that wage differentials across
industries persist because firms use wages to control turnover. However, there
 B and S (, -).  This is similar to the neutral allocation effect of
self–selection discussed in (S and S, ).  With regard to unemployment and
taxation in an efficiency–wage setting, see (H, ).

may be other means to render all jobs equally attractive, and private incentives
to introduce such measures. Firms may ask for entrance fees to capture the job
rents accruing to the workers, or they may ask for bonding. This problem has been
discussed extensively in the context of efficiency wage theory.
If these mechanisms lead to an equalization of utility across careers, the present
argument would break down. Casual empiricism suggests that bonding, seniority
pay and similar measures are actually used, but not to the point of entirely elimi-
nating utility differentials across careers. As long as such utility differentials (i.e.,
those not due to “intrinsic” differences in productivity), persist, arguments of the
type developed in this paper are relevant. In contrast to the present paper, reality
presents a set of complex, rather than stylized, cases.
The main theoretical argument supporting the present view relates to what
S (, ) has termed the “double moral hazard problem”. For example,
if the firm uses seniority pay as a bonding instrument, this may help to reduce
turnover costs. It may, however, also make firms interested in getting rid of the
overpaid senior workers. A prohibition on firing senior workers is, however,
harmful for work incentives. Job purchases must also be combined with a safeguard
against firing. This is again detrimental for performance incentives. Fairness
considerations may further restrict contracting. All this limits the scope for
seniority pay as a bonding mechanism and lends plausibility to the assumption that
utility differentials across careers may persist.
Heterogeneity. The presented argument does not depend too strongly on homo-
geneity. The corresponding assumptions have been made primarily to eliminate all
“standard” explanations for wage differentials and render the argument in this way
more transparent.
If each industry has a specific production function fi (ni) , different from that of
other industries, and specific fixed costs qi , all equations remain valid in the sense
that production functions and fixed costs are to be indexed appropriately. The
results on wage determination (), price distortion (), (), and the equivalence
between value-added and the wage rate (), () remain unaffected. Thus, the
general conclusions remain the same.
Differences in turnover propensities between industries can be handled similar
to differences in turnover propensities between men and women in the discussion
 S (,  f.) for a review.  L () has analyzed mandatory retirement. The
practice points in this direction. In Germany, a court has declared the usual mandatory retirement
provisions in labor contracts illegal. This has enabled workers to obtain considerable amounts of
money as compensation for their consent to early retirement (S Z, , ).
 S and W (, -).  G and K ().

of discrimination (Section ). Differences in “intrinsic” productivity between
workers can also be introduced. This would, however, undermine the welfare
implications which depend crucially on the assumption that wage differentials have
no positive allocative role to play. Once a positive allocative function of wages is
taken into account, results will be mixed. It seems to be clear, however, that wages
reflecting other things than scarcities will induce firms to misallocate labor because
they take the wages as scarcity indicators in their own calculations. In this sense,
the existence of job rents indicates efficiency losses. More generally, we may allow
for productivity differentials across workers, turnover cost differentials across firms,
and the possibility of workers to move between industries which would render
turnover in each industry dependent upon all other wage rates. However, the
case of turnover cost differentials between men and women (Section ) carries
ambiguous efficiency consequences already, and we should, thus, not expect any
clear-cut efficiency result under even more general circumstances.
Taxation. The result that a more progressive wage tax will flatten the wage
profile before taxes is in striking contrast to presumptions informed by human
capital theory. Yet it is fairly general in the sense that it should carry over to many
types of efficiency wage models. The argument is that once wages are used as
instruments, and the efficacy of these instruments is reduced by raising progressivity,
the instruments will be used less intensely.
C R
Turnover costs may lead to wage formation in such a way that wages are determined
by turnover propensities. This permits workers to capture inefficient job rents.
Price distortions and discrimination (both efficient and inefficient) may result. A
progressive wage tax may be welfare enhancing. All this challenges the conventional
view of wage formation, but the model is admittedly stylised. Its purpose has been
simply to highlight the orthogonal case.
 In other words equation () describing turnover in each industry as solely dependent on the
typical firms wage vi and the industry wage wi can be replaced by the more general assumption
τi = τ (vi/wi; w1,w2, ... ,wi−1,wi+1, ... ,wI) which permits workers flow across industries. Such a
formulation would not alter formal analysis with regard to the equilibria, but the corresponding
dynamic adjustment (the analogue to equations ()–()) is complex.  This would hold true in
the model by S (), for example.

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